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Reform of the international monetary system was placed on the 
agenda of the Group of 20 (G-20) a year ago at the initiative of 
the incoming French leadership of the G-20. On November 4, 
2011 in Cannes, France, the G-20 leaders will announce their 
conclusions and agreements after a year and half of intense dia-
logue and debate. This policy brief summarizes my preliminary 
rating of the expected results based on the evidence to date: a 
barely passing grade on substance but an A for effort. Neither 
final grade is locked in stone, however.
First, let’s cover some preliminaries. The international mon-
etary system is the set of obligations, rules, conventions, proce-
dures, and institutions that shape the international economic and 
financial policies of governments in their interactions with other 
governments. The international monetary system is a subcom-
ponent of the much larger international financial system, which 
is dominated by private-sector actors. The broader international 
financial system also has its rules, conventions, and institutions. 
It can be influenced, but not controlled, by governments and 
the formal arrangements of the international monetary system.
From this perspective, the links between the international 
monetary system and the global economic and financial crises 
of 2007 to 2011 are at best tenuous (Truman 2009a, 2010c). 
Thus, reforming the international monetary system by itself 
will  have  little  impact  on  either  crisis  prevention  or  crisis 
management in the future. Therefore, (1) there is no pressing 
need to reform the international monetary system and (2) the 
system will, and should, continue to evolve as it has over the 
past four decades.
Nevertheless, I applaud the initiatives that have led to the 
current review of the international monetary system. I also ap-
plaud those who support a comprehensive review of all aspects 
of the system, rejecting magic-bullet approaches. The review is 
long overdue. The last review was conducted in the mid-1990s.1 
1. In the wake of the Asian financial crisis some adjustments were made to 
what was then called the international financial architecture, such as the 
establishment of a set of international financial codes and standards and the 
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Another occurred about a decade before under the auspices of 
the G-10 countries. The most prominent effort was that of the 
Committee of Twenty (C-20) on Reform of the International 
Monetary System and Related Issues, which attempted to put 
the Bretton Woods international monetary system back together 
after its collapse in 1971. In the end, the C-20 sanctified float-
ing exchange rates and made a number of other changes in the 
International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement that came 
into force in 1978. However, in the opinion of a substantial 
number of observers, the C-20 effort fell substantially short of 
a comprehensive reform of the international monetary system, 
which is one reason why the topic is a hardy perennial on the 
international economic policy agenda. 
The current international monetary system reform discus-
sion can be organized under five headings: (1) surveillance of the 
global economy and financial system, (2) international lender of 
last resort mechanisms, (3) capital flows and financial pressures, 
(4) the currency and reserve asset system, and (5) governance 
of the international monetary system. I use these five headings 
to provide an abbreviated, advance, preliminary report card on 
what we can expect in Cannes. 
n  Desirable reforms would receive an A whenever they are 
delivered and, in particular, if they are at least promised in 
Cannes. 
n  Feasible reforms would receive a B if delivered by the end 
of 2011. 
n  Unacceptable nonprogress by the end of the year would 
receive an F. 
My expected end-of-year grading is based on the available 
evidence to date, which includes the communiqués of the G-20 
ministers and governors, a slew of papers from the IMF staff 
and associated reactions and commentaries, discussions at the 
April 2011 meeting of the IMF’s International Monetary and 
Financial Committee (IMFC), and numerous high- and lower-
level seminars and conferences.
Surveillance of the Global economy 
and financial SyStem
With respect to surveillance and the associated issues of the 
adjustment  of  global  macroeconomic  imbalances,  exchange 
rates, and financial stability, a desirable A-grade outcome of the 
discussions would embrace what I have advocated on IMF sur-
creation of the G-20 finance ministers and central bank governors, but the 
basic outlines of the international monetary system were unchanged.
veillance reform (Truman 2010e) and was implicitly endorsed 
by the Palais Royal Initiative (2011):
n  IMF members would accept a formal obligation for ensur-
ing the stability of the international monetary system—for 
global as well as national economic and financial stabil-
ity—in addition to their current obligations focused on 
their own domestic and external economic and financial 
stability. 
n  Compliance by members with their expanded IMF obli-
gations would be subject to ongoing reviews triggered by 
quantitative norms, in particular for the systemically im-
portant countries. 
n  Reviews of compliance by senior officials could potentially 
lead to consequences, teeth, or sanctions to give the surveil-
lance traction. 
n  The  strengthened  surveillance  would  operate  with  en-
hanced accountability and transparency.
A  feasible,  B-grade  outcome  this  year  would  be  if  the 
systemically important countries individually and collectively, 
broadly the G-20 and its members, (1) agreed that they have 
individual responsibility in their domestic economic and finan-
cial policies and performance for global economic and financial 
stability—a de facto obligation short of amending the IMF 
Articles of Agreement—and (2) coupled that agreement with 
an interim outcome from the G-20 framework for strong, sus-
tainable, and balanced growth—the G-20 mutual assessment 
process—that included specific policy and performance com-
mitments for which countries subsequently could be and would 
be held publicly accountable.
An unacceptable, F-grade outcome would be no further 
progress on surveillance and bland, soon-forgotten promises 
from the G-20 mutual assessment process. 
Preliminary Rating. I expect that the results from Cannes will 
merit a barely passing grade. The G-20 should receive no credit 
for policy commitments that are either vacuous or even if con-
crete involve no follow-up on promises made. The results from 
Cannes may include some procedural progress encompassing 
the continuation of IMF spillover reports on how the policies 
and performance of the major economies affect other countries, 
a new multilateral surveillance report from the IMF, and mar-
ginal improvements in the transparency of the IMF’s surveil-
lance processes, for example, release of estimates of exchange 
rate overvaluation and undervaluation. 
I  am  prepared  to  be  surprised,  but  even  these  modest 
results are not assured. The principal reason why progress on 
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diagnosis of how to achieve global economic and financial sta-
bility and that lack of a shared diagnosis paralyzes the prospect 
for fundamental change.
international lender of laSt reSort 
mechaniSmS
International lender of last resort issues involve the conditional, 
but also the largely unconditional, provision of financial assis-
tance to countries adversely affected by international financial 
crises, principally through the IMF. 
A desirable A-grade outcome would include 
1.  agreement on a comprehensive prequalification approach 
to IMF lending that is applied to all countries as part of the 
Article IV review process; 
2.  agreement to provide the IMF with the capacity to allocate 
special  drawing  rights  (SDR)  temporarily  in  a  systemic 
crisis; 
3.  establishment of a global stabilization mechanism through 
which the IMF can volunteer support to members under 
certain conditions; 
4.  establishment  of  a  global  swap  network  among  central 
banks, linked to the IMF, and designed to support private 
financial institutions in a systemic liquidity crisis;
5.  agreement that the IMF should borrow in the private inter-
national capital market to augment its financial resources 
in a crisis;2 and
6.  agreement on a robust framework of cooperation between 
the IMF and regional authorities on mutually supportive 
financial and surveillance activities.
A feasible B-grade outcome would include items (3) to 
(5) on this list—the global stabilization mechanism, the global 
swap network, and IMF borrowing in the private market.
An unacceptable, F-grade outcome would be to do noth-
ing beyond the status quo, even recognizing the substantial, 
constructive evolution of IMF lending facilities over the past 
three years. I would mark down any agreement on arrange-
ments between the IMF and regional groups, which may be 
likely, because those arrangements are likely not to live up 
to  the  comprehensive  standard  for  such  arrangements  pro-
posed by C. Randall Henning (2011) and to suffer from the 
deficiency described by Morris Goldstein (2011) in that they 
would envisage that the IMF would be the junior financial 
partner and, therefore, the junior substantive partner in such 
2. I have elaborated on these five items in Truman (2010b, 2010d).
arrangements,  undercutting  IMF  conditionality  and  leaving 
those countries that are not members of a regional group short 
of needed financing.
Preliminary Rating. I expect that the results from Cannes will 
deserve a grade of F. The reason is that, on the one hand, many 
countries continue to attach stigma to borrowing from the IMF, 
which leads them to downplay IMF-centered solutions, and on 
the other hand, many potential official lenders to and through 
the IMF are sufficiently concerned about moral hazard consid-
erations that they will block further progress. 
With respect to a global swap network among central 
banks linked to the IMF, the major central banks appear to 
be resistant to any arrangement that would impinge on their 
independence and to be allergic to any link between their 
so-called  monetary  operations  and  IMF  decision-making. 
Their cry is leave it to the central bankers meeting at the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS). They seem to be repeating 
the opposition to the IMF from central bankers when the 
IMF was founded in 1944 in the wake of the central bankers’ 
dismal performance on international monetary cooperation 
before and during the Great Depression. Moreover, it is not 
clear why their respective national public opinions would be 
more supportive of arrangements involving the BIS over ones 
that involve the IMF as well.
capital flowS and financial preSSureS
The management of international capital flows and associated 
issues of pressures on currencies and financial systems have 
reemerged  on  the  international  monetary  system  agenda. 
I  say  reemerged  because  the  volatility  of  capital  flows  was 
on the agenda at Bretton Woods and also during the C-20 
discussions. 
With respect to the receipt and delivery of capital flows, a 
desirable A-grade outcome would be agreement to amend the 
IMF articles along the lines that I envisaged a year ago (Truman 
2010a). Such an amendment would 
1.  establish the long-term objective of complete freedom of 
capital movements without an explicit timetable for doing 
so;
2.  provide a guide for national policies in terms of the rights 
and responsibilities of both source and recipient countries, 
and
3.  position the IMF staff and management to monitor com-
pliance along the lines of my proposals for IMF surveil-
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A feasible, B-grade outcome would build on the consider-
able progress that has been made over the past year in establish-
ing a consensus on these contentious issues and include a broader 
shared  understanding  of  the  so-called  push  factors  (Truman 
2011). Whether such progress is embodied in a framework, code 
of conduct, or “coherent conclusions for the management of 
capital flows drawing on country experience,” in the language of 
the April 15, 2011 G-20 communiqué, is not important. At this 
point, substance should dominate form.
An unacceptable F-grade outcome would roll back to the 
status quo ante of 2009—a free-for-all in which there is no 
shared framework for multilateral dialogue on these issues.
Preliminary Rating. I expect a B-grade outcome on this topic. 
Although some countries are jealously guarding their room to 
maneuver (aka national sovereignty) to impose restrictions on 
capital flows, the authorities in those countries know that noth-
ing that is currently on the table in a B-grade outcome would 
fundamentally hinder them, unless they are hypersensitive to 
criticism that would occur even without a framework. They 
also know that if they are to gain greater scope to examine and 
criticize the policies they see as promoting capital movements, 
there must be a quid pro quo.
the currency and reServe aSSet SyStem
Some observers argue that the central problem with the inter-
national monetary system is that it is centered on a few reserve 
currencies that make up international reserves. Some would say 
a single currency: the US dollar. The strong version of this cri-
tique is patently false in my view (Truman 2009b). 
From my perspective, with respect to the currency and re-
serve asset system, a desirable A-grade outcome would be 
1.  broad acceptance of the inevitable further evolution toward 
a multi-currency system;
2.  broad acceptance also that the level and composition of the 
reserve assets are largely demand determined;
3.  abandoning, after a full discussion as is under way in 2011, 
(a) creation a new outside international money based on the 
SDR, (b) official promotion of the private use of the SDR, 
and (c) specious arguments in favor of creating additional 
so-called safe assets, including via an IMF substitution ac-
count (of national currencies for SDR), which would offer 
highly perverse international adjustment incentives; and
4.  agreement on regular, sizeable, annual SDR allocations that 
are firmly coupled with rigorous surveillance over reserve 
accumulation and associated incentives and disincentives 
(Truman 2010e, Palais Royal Initiative 2011).3
A feasible B-grade outcome would include (a) the first three 
items on the A-grade list, (b) a cosmetic agreement that the SDR 
basket should expand as other currencies qualify essentially on 
current terms, which are that the currency be extensively used 
in  international  trade  and  financial  transactions,  implying 
substantial  capital  account  convertibility  and  exchange  rate 
flexibility, and (c) endorsement of IMF borrowing in the private 
market but only to meet its liquidity needs, not to promote the 
private use of the SDR.
An unacceptable, F-grade outcome would involve only an 
agreement to continue to spin more wheels toward the objec-
tives of creating a new outside international money, encouraging 
the private use of the SDR, and creating additional safe assets.
Preliminary Rating. I expect something short of a B-grade 
outcome from the G-20 leaders in Cannes: implicit acceptance 
of (1) and (2), agreement to study some or all of the elements 
of (3), and something on the composition of the SDR basket in 
terms of the path to its eventual enlargement that does alter the 
current trajectory.
Governance of the international 
monetary SyStem
Governance of the international monetary system in the form 
of governance of the IMF, as the principal international organi-
zation responsible for the international monetary system, is not 
explicitly on the agenda of the G-20 leaders. The topic has been 
extensively discussed in recent years. Considerable progress has 
been made in some dimensions, in particular agreements on the 
future redistribution of IMF executive board chairs and voting 
shares. Two issues have not been resolved: the management selec-
tion process and the possible establishment of a ministerial-level 
body with explicit powers, replacing the IMFC, which formally 
3. Palais Royal Initiative (2011) contains some proposals on the SDR with 
which I do not agree, but it also endorses the use of SDR allocations as a car-
rot and a stick in the international monetary system.
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is only advisory. The resignation of Dominique Strauss-Kahn as 
managing director of the IMF has placed the first issue on the 
agenda with high priority.4
A desirable, A-grade outcome on governance would include
1.  an agreement to merge the IMFC with the G-20 ministers 
and governors and convert the resulting body into one with 
formal powers with selection of its membership based on 
the constituency system employed to choose members of 
the IMF executive board and the IMFC, and
2.  selection of a new managing director of the IMF via an 
open process with both the process and the result broadly 
supported by most members of the IMF.
A feasible, B-grade outcome would include only the second 
item. On my criteria, I would not require that the new managing 
director not be European, as has been the custom in the past, nor 
that the United States formally commit not to nominate a US 
citizen to be the next president of the World Bank. If the manag-
ing director did come from Europe, what is important is the 
4. The resignation, though not the surrounding drama, was not a surprise 
because Strauss-Kahn was expected to return to France to run for president.
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